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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between social propaganda as presented by Jacques Ellul in his 
book Propaganda: the Formation of Men’s Attitudes and the concept of autopoiesis (or self-
generation) within posthuman ideology. These two concepts intersect in their connection of the 
individual to the masses. Both posthuman theory and Ellul’s concept of social interaction are based on 
the bridging of the ontological gap to overcome cognitive isolation, resulting in the engagement in a 
community outside of oneself. The stripping of individuality becomes necessary, as our self-contained 
autopoietic beings employ analogical inference in order to connect with the mass, and therefore be 
subject to the influences of propaganda. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Propaganda, as a social force, draws upon the influence of the lonely individual 
within the collective mass. Ellul claims, “Propaganda strips the individual, robs him 
of part of himself, and makes him live in an alien and artificial life, to such an extent 
that he becomes another person and obeys impulses foreign to him” (169). As a 
member of mass society, the individual is inescapably affected by propaganda 
targeted at the whole, as he, simply by entering into a relationship with the mass, 
bridges the ontological gap between the citizen and his contemporary social system.  
 
I argue in favor of Ellul’s claim that it is unavoidable that propaganda strips our 
individuality. Philosophically speaking, our autopoietic (or self-created) nature 
comes into direct contact with our social systems in our simulation of the worldview 
of “the other.” Although our minds are limited by this solipsistic nature, we 
naturally extend our understanding of ourselves to those around us and, in turn, 
engage with the community. Through the theory of posthumanism, it is possible for 
us to gain a better understanding of the intricacies of the masses. This autopoietic 
virtual existence “increases the system’s connection and sensitivity to, and 
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dependence on, the environment” and connects with the other on the basis of our 
shared isolation (Wolfe xxiv). The dualism of our experiences within the mass 
allows us to enter into a relationship with the techniques of propaganda, thus pulling 
us out of our isolated worldviews. 
 
Posthuman theory goes beyond traditional humanist theory emerging after The 
Enlightenment that dictated philosophical thought for a significant period of history. 
In his book What is Posthumanism?, Cary Wolfe explores this new ideology and its 
delicate relationship with humanism. The central tenant of posthuman philosophy is 
the existence of humans in autopoietic, individually created virtual worlds. This 
theory, emerging in the late 1990s and gaining recent attention in sociological, 
philosophical, and theoretical fields, expounds upon the humanism that was a part of 
Renaissance thought. The idea of the “embeddedness of the human being in...its 
technological world, the prosthetic coevolution of the human animal with the 
technicity of tools and external archival mechanisms (such as language and culture)” 
uniquely differentiates posthumanist theory from humanist theory, entering the 
individual into dialogue with the outside masses (Wolfe xv). Such a dialogue, I argue, 
disallows complete isolation and brings the individual into contact with the 
techniques of propaganda. 
 
The term autopoietic was first coined in a seemingly unrelated field, albeit linked to 
posthumanism on a philosophical level. Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, 
Chilean biologists, first used the word in the 1980s to describe the self-referential 
nature of living cells. Since the advent of this theory, the term has been used in the 
field of sociology in the manner in which I apply it here.  
 
Maturana and Varela describe an autopoietic machine as a  
 
machine organized...as a network of processes of production (transformation 
and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and 
transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes 
(relations) that produce them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete 
unity in space in which (the components) exist by specifying the topological 
domain of its realization as such a network. (Maturana and Varela 78) 
 
As this definition has transitioned from being a solely scientific term to use within the 
spheres of systems theory, it provides insight into explanations for human cognition 
and social interactions. As self-contained creatures, our cognitive experiences 
disallow a genuine shift in our viewpoints to reach out and bridge the gap between the 
self and the other. Many philosophers in their exploration of posthuman theory pose 
similar questions in the face of such cognitive isolation: How do the limitations of our 
mind allow us to live and interact as social creatures?  
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The fact that an autopoietic existence does not maintain even the smallest amount of 
shared cognitive space may seem to dismiss the possibility of empathy in any sense. 
The severity of solipsistic phenomenology is differentiated on the spectrum of 
posthuman thought. Solipsism, the epistemological idea of uncertainty of any mind 
other than ones own, indicates a kind of doubt and complete isolation. The strength of 
solipsistic belief, ranging from metaphysical (extreme uncertainty) to methodological 
(a functioning agnosticism in regard to the knowledge of other minds), can create a 
rift in the understanding of how individuals relate to one another (Khashaba). 
Posthumanism acknowledges the potential for epistemological doubt and addresses it. 
By recognizing the autopoiesis of both oneself and the other, it is possible to simulate 
in one’s mind the worldview of the other. Empathy is related to the understanding of 
the worldview of another person, if only through simulation. By performing the 
worldview of another, which is something that we do on a daily basis in our 
functioning as social beings, it is possible to get a closer space of overlap. 
 
The severe uncertainty within metaphysical solipsism poses the question of the 
existence of others. This is one of the most thoroughly discussed and seemingly 
exhaustive conversations in the field of philosophy and is explored in the problem of 
other minds as presented by René Descartes. This conundrum presents the conceptual 
issue that we may be incapable of understanding or even determining the existence of 
conscious inner life of other human beings. Many of us go about our days 
undoubtedly certain that others are experiencing life in a similar way to us. This 
assumption, grounded upon analogical inference, is based upon the fact that we 
extend our perceptions and knowledge of ourselves to those who are similar to us. In 
essence, we assume that others have experiences like us because they appear to be 
like us (Hyslop). The problem of other minds brings the skeptic into the light, 
allowing him to question the justification of our certainty. This analogical inference 
allows humans to both function in mass society and be influenced by propaganda. By 
making assumptions and essentially reaching out beyond our solipsistic doubts, we 
are able to engage with technique that would otherwise be impossible. 
 
This inference critically overcomes the central anxiety of the problem of other minds. 
By not extending the understanding of the self to the other, “the poverty of solipsism 
is to ignore the degree to which all individuals go through experiences that basically 
belong to the same common (‘universal’) types in being born, struggling to grow up, 
working to survive...growing old, and dying” (Agosta 2). Agosta brings into light the 
most critical piece of posthuman solipsistic theory that indicates a direct engagement 
with propaganda. Generally speaking, the underlying suppositions of solipsistic 
cognition dismiss what Ellul would claim as one of the most critical prerequisites for 
successful propaganda: the collective. Ellul’s claims align with posthuman theory in 
that he believes the “human contact [within propaganda] is false and merely 
simulated” (24). This parallels the individually created world that is so crucial in 
posthuman theory and in Descartes’s problem of other minds. Because of, rather than 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                          Holmes | 147 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
in spite of, this simulated interaction, Ellul in part aligns himself with the self-
contained autopoietic worldview included in posthuman thought that argues for the 
necessity of simulation in order for understanding to occur. 
 
Ellul’s partial alignment with posthumanism is due to his moralizing tone in regard to 
the attacking nature of propaganda. Morality within the humanist realm is specifically 
human centered. Slightly different from the modern secularism, humanist morality 
relies on the centrality of human nature to our elevated status in the realm of moral 
decision. Ellul’s tone, then, with his use of words such as “attack” and “prey,” 
contrasts slightly with the nature of posthuman autopoeisis in that the moral issues 
surrounding propaganda lead to dehumanization and the reduction of the individual to 
an average. It is critical that the posthuman view of propaganda recognize that the 
performance of the worldview of the other also comes into contact with 
quintessentially humanist moral dilemmas that attack the humanist individual nature 
of members of the crowd.   
 
However, this humanist morality does not dismiss the inherently necessary nature of 
autopoietic simulation. This simulation allows us to draw meaning from our 
environment, embracing our reduction to an average. “Meaning now becomes a 
specifically modern form of self-referential recursivity that is used by both psychic 
systems (consciousness) and social systems (communication) to handle overwhelming 
environmental complexity” (Wolfe xx). These psychic systems, which Ellul would 
refer to as the individual (the lonely individual, perhaps), are differentiated from the 
social systems that he would argue include propaganda. By creating meaning from 
within the self, each individual is able to make decisions and determine their own 
validity as autonomous individuals. The very nature of solipsism makes it clear that 
the only true knowledge we have is that of a knowledge of our own mind. By being 
unsure of the experiences and legitimacy of the consciousness of others, it is possible 
for us to be pushed further into isolation and made more aware of and secure in our 
own cognitive awareness (Wolfe xx). However, this “self-referential recursivity” that 
Wolfe describes does not eliminate the influence of the other. Indeed, by the simple 
existence of our solitary nature, we are even more under the influence of the other in a 
social context. This modern type of self-reference becomes the source of such a 
significant influence, entering the social environment into critical discourse with the 
conscious experience of the individual. 
 
Posthuman theory cautions against the idea of absolute solipsism, which, as 
previously mentioned, pushes us further into isolation. Wolfe hints at the subtle 
differences between solipsism and autopoiesis, drawing attention to the severe 
isolation present in a solipsistic worldview. He emphasizes the critical, connective 
piece of self-generative, autopoietic experience: that of openness to the outside world. 
It is often described as “opening at the closure,” as that which alienates us makes us 
more in tune with the other. By recognizing the unique, individualized experience of 
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the other, we connect with them. This connection, Ellul argues, is only in our 
reduction to an average. Propaganda is effective because we, as autopoietic beings, 
are able to empathize, to put ourselves in someone else’s shoes, and to identify with 
those around us. This average and common experience of empathy is what Ellul refers 
to in the “average” individual. Regardless of whether or not this identification is with 
a leader, a political movement, or simply with someone of a similar status, it allows 
us to understand (if only from an objective perspective) the experience of those who 
we are biologically restricted from understanding, as the solipsist would argue.  
 
The nature of a mass, according to Ellul, includes the composition of individuals, the 
reduction of persons to an average, and the sovereignty and subjectivity that 
comprises the body politic (Ellul xvi). Our identities as humans in this mass society 
are formed through our relationships; it is the currents of thought in the mass to which 
the individual reaches out to associate with. By grasping on to sociological 
commonalities, the individual is not only able to empathize with his neighbor, but is 
also able to calm the central anxieties of his autopoietic existence. Within the context 
of mass society, symbols exist in a favorable manner. By giving common experience, 
societal symbols are critical to the individual and his relationship with the mass. Our 
unique cognitive constructions, as Kenneth Burke refers to as terminstic screens, 
allow us a personalized view of the world with which we understand all that 
surrounds us (Burke). Burke claims that “there will be as many different world views 
in human history as there are people” (52). By operating under these screens, we seek 
out representations of this worldview in our interactions and daily lives. Symbols 
become important, then, in that we seek to identify things we understand and identify 
with those signs and symbols. This “dramatistic screen involves a method of tracking 
down of the implications in the idea of symbolic man” (Burke 54). As we reach 
toward symbols that connect us to the realm of the social, propaganda further takes 
hold. Being reduced to an average, the individual is subject to the innumerable forces 
of symbolic power. 
 
The mass is structured so as to reduce the delineation between the singular being and 
the group. Ellul differentiates the lonely individual from the crowd, and emphasizes 
the importance of this solitariness. The more isolated an individual feels, Ellul argues, 
the more they will attempt to engage in a community through the means of 
propaganda (92). The uniformity that exists within the mass disallows individuality, 
as “they have enough in common for propaganda to act on them directly” (Ellul 94). 
In their attempted engagement in community, the individual reaches outside of his 
self-generating self-concept in order to empathize with the other. The lonely crowd, 
while the ideal situation for the propagandist, is also the ideal situation for any social 
interaction, as it allows, rather than forces, a small yet significant overlap in cognitive 
space among community members.  
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As this shared mental space allows for social connection, Ellul emphasizes the critical 
role of the collective in absorbing the impact of propaganda. A fault of many extreme 
solipsists and even posthumanists is the assumption that we are entirely isolated and 
cut off from any remote understanding of the world. However, Ellul’s very 
description of the mass includes the fact that individuals are reduced to what they 
have in common with others (8). By reaching out to what those common elements are 
(the sociological commonalities that posthumanism heavily relies upon), the masses 
have given propaganda a platform on which to function. Within our self-maintaining 
structure, “the very thing that separates us from the world connects us to the world, 
and self-referential, autopoietic closure, far from indicating a kind of solipsistic neo-
Kantian idealism, actually is generative of openness to the environment” (Wolfe xxi). 
This autopoietic structure, then, is embodied within the masses and in the social world 
to which we ascribe meaning.  
 
Social Construction Theory addresses one of the central themes that connects 
posthumanism and propaganda: the creation of collective meaning. Ellul describes 
this theme, in part, as the participation of the individual in the mass, while posthuman 
theorists describe this theme as the dialogue between the world of the self and the 
other. This unique relationship forms the basis for the potential success of influence 
and social control; “social interaction [is] the loom upon which the social fabric is 
woven” (Leeds-Hurwitz 891). The externalization of activity by human beings allows 
for this construction of reality that is so pervasive yet so often easily dismissed. 
Through habitualization of behavior on an individual basis, man extends his internal 
life externally (Berger and Luckmann 53). The dialectical relationship between man 
and the outside world draws attention to the intrinsic construction of the collectivities 
that unite men. 
 
Within Social Construction Theory, falling into the “everything is a construct” 
fallacy is dangerous, as it dismisses the intimate relationship between humans, as 
autopoietic creatures, and the outside, social world that has the power to influence 
greatly. Simply because the institutionalized experiences in our society are created 
to be objective by man himself does not negate the significant power they hold; 
propaganda within the social realm functions as “an inner control over the 
individual by a social force, which means that it deprives him of himself” (Ellul 87). 
This deprivation of self indicates the importance of the susceptibility of the 
individual to the forces of propaganda.  
 
Ellul would argue that theoretical individualism is a construct insomuch as it 
dismisses social influence. By living in mass society, Ellul maintains, the individual 
is unable to be isolated or “individualistic” despite human’s natural cognitive 
solipsism. It seems as if theoretical individuality is also socially constructed, creating 
simply another means for the autopoietic individual to find common ground with the 
other. “In individualist reality, each human being is subject to innumerable forces and 
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influences” (Ellul 91). Ellul elaborates on this claim, explicating upon the 
sociological conditions required for propaganda to take hold. The individual is more 
susceptible to “be caught up in a social current, thus becoming easy prey for 
propaganda” as he enters into mass society (Ellul 92). If Ellul correctly assumes that 
our individuality is self-generated, humans will then continually enter into dialogue 
with our inherently solipsistic nature. By assuming that this type of personal 
individualism is false and disingenuous (as a form of genuine understanding of our 
relationship with mass society), autopoietic theory becomes an appropriate 
explanation for our inner cognitive processes.  
 
As a member of mass society, the individual enters into critical discourse with those 
around him in an empathetic manner in order to move past his irreconcilable 
solipsistic nature. By recognizing the self-contained cognitive existence of every 
other with whom he enters into dialogue, the individual essentially becomes a being 
susceptible to the influence of others. Posthumanism, then, becomes an appropriate 
philosophical lens through which to view the interaction between the individual 
within the mass and the effects of propaganda. Propaganda takes hold, as a social 
influence, as it seeks to alienate the individual from what they perceive as a sense of 
individualism. Ascribing meaning to social relationships as well as the techniques 
with which we enter into relationships solidifies our self-contained nature, while 
simultaneously attributing credit to the connecting forces between the environment 
and our cognitive systems. 
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